USGS Report Released: Organic Contaminants, Trace and Major Elements, and Nutrients in Water and Sediment Sampled in Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Recently, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) released a report titled Organic Contaminants, Trace and Major Elements, and Nutrients in Water and Sediment Sampled in Response to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (USGS Sci. Invstgn Rep. 2012-5228). The 110-page report available here, discusses:

[b]each water and sediment samples were collected along the Gulf of Mexico coast to assess differences in contaminant concentrations before and after landfall of Macondo-1 well oil released into the Gulf of Mexico from the sinking of the British Petroleum Corporation's Deepwater Horizon drilling platform. Samples were collected at 70 coastal sites between May 7 and July 7, 2010, to document baseline, or "pre-landfall" conditions. A subset of 48 sites was resampled during October 4 to 14, 2010, after oil had made landfall on the Gulf of Mexico coast, called the "post-landfall" sampling period, to determine if actionable concentrations of oil were present along shorelines. Few organic contaminants were detected in water; their detection frequencies generally were low and similar in pre-landfall and post-landfall samples. Only one organic contaminant--toluene--had significantly higher concentrations in post-landfall than pre-landfall water samples. No water samples exceeded any human-health benchmarks, and only one post-landfall water sample exceeded an aquatic-life benchmark--the toxic-unit benchmark for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) mixtures. In sediment, concentrations of 3 parent PAHs and 17 alkylated PAH groups were significantly higher in post-landfall samples than pre-landfall samples. One pre-landfall sample from Texas exceeded the sediment toxic-unit benchmark for PAH mixtures; this site was not sampled during the post-landfall period. Empirical upper screening-value benchmarks for PAHs in sediment were exceeded at 37 percent of post-landfall samples and 22 percent of pre-landfall samples, but there was no significant difference in the proportion of samples exceeding benchmarks between paired pre-landfall and post-landfall samples. Seven sites had the largest concentration differences between post-landfall and pre-landfall samples for 15 alkylated PAHs. Five of these seven sites, located in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, had diagnostic geochemical evidence of Macondo-1 oil in post-landfall sediments and tarballs. For trace and major elements in water, analytical reporting levels for several elements were high and variable. No human-health benchmarks were exceeded, although these were available for only two elements. Aquatic-life benchmarks for trace elements were exceeded in 47 percent of water samples overall. The elements responsible for the most exceedances in post-landfall samples were boron, copper, and manganese. Benchmark exceedances in water could be substantially underestimated because some samples had reporting levels higher than the applicable benchmarks (such as cobalt, copper, lead and zinc) and some elements (such as boron and vanadium) were analyzed in samples from only one sampling period. For trace elements in whole sediment, empirical upper screening-value benchmarks were exceeded in 57 percent of post-landfall samples and 40 percent of pre-landfall samples, but there was no significant difference in the proportion of samples exceeding benchmarks between paired pre-landfall and post-landfall samples. Benchmark exceedance frequencies could be conservatively high because they are based on measurements of total trace-element concentrations in sediment. In the less than 63-micrometer sediment fraction, one or more trace or major elements were anthropogenically enriched relative to national baseline values for U.S. streams for all sediment samples except one. Sixteen percent of sediment samples exceeded upper screening-value benchmarks for, and were enriched in, one or more of the following elements: barium, vanadium, aluminum, manganese, arsenic, chromium, and cobalt. These samples were evenly divided between the sampling periods. Aquatic-life benchmarks were frequently exceeded along the Gulf of Mexico coast by trace elements in both water and sediment and by PAHs in sediment. For the most part, however, significant differences between pre-landfall and post-landfall samples were limited to concentrations of PAHs in sediment. At five sites along the coast, the higher post-landfall concentrations of PAHs were associated with diagnostic geochemical evidence of Deepwater Horizon Macondo-1 oil.

CRS Report Released: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments

The Congressional Research Service (CRS), the public policy research arm of Congress, recently issued the report Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments (Jan. 31, 2013). The 15-page report authored by Jonathan L. Ramseur and Curry L. Hagerty discusses the following:

Summary

In the wake of the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, the federal government, state governments, and responsible parties faced an unprecedented challenge. An oil discharge continued for 84 days, resulting in the largest oil spill in U.S. waters—estimated at approximately 206 million gallons (4.9 million barrels).

Response activities, led by the U.S. Coast Guard, continue but have diminished substantially.

• At the height of operations (summer of 2010), response personnel numbered over 47,000; as of January 2013, that figure has dropped to about 935.
• As of December 2012, approximately 339 miles of oiled shoreline remain subject to evaluation and/or cleanup operations.
• As a responsible party, BP has spent over $14 billion in cleanup operations.

To date, BP has paid over $10 billion to the federal government, state and local governments, and private parties for economic claims and other expenses, including response costs, related to the oil spill. BP estimates that a recently approved settlement will lead to an additional $7.8 billion in payments to private parties.

BP and other responsible parties have agreed to civil and/or criminal settlements with the Department of Justice (DOJ). Although some are awaiting court approval, settlements from various parties, to date, total almost $6 billion. BP’s potential civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, which could be considerable, are not yet determined.

The natural resources damage assessment (NRDA) process, conducted by federal, state, and other trustees, is ongoing, now in its restoration planning phase. BP agreed to pay $1 billion to support early restoration projects. Ten such projects have been funded to date, with aggregate estimated costs of approximately $71 million.

The 112th Congress enacted two oil spill-related legislative proposals, including the following:

• The RESTORE Act: enacted on July 6, 2012, as a subtitle in P.L. 112-141 (MAP-21), it directs 80% of any administrative and civil Clean Water Act Section 311penalty revenue into a newly created trust fund, which supports environmental and economic restoration projects in the Gulf states.
• The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011: enacted on January 3, 2012 (P.L. 112-90), the act increases civil penalties for pipeline violations and requires a study of leak detection systems, a review of the regulations that apply to pipeline transport of “diluted bitumen” (i.e., oil sands), and an analysis whether such oil presents an increased risk of release.

In 2011, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (DOI) redefined the responsibilities previously performed by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) and reassigned the functions of the offshore energy program among three separate organizations: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR). These agencies have promulgated several rulemaking changes, some of which are based on issues raised by the Deepwater Horizon spill.

GAO Report Released: Interior’s Reorganization Complete, but Challenges Remain in Implementing New Requirements

Recently the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released its report, titled
Interior’s Reorganization Complete, but Challenges Remain in Implementing New Requirement GAO-12-423 (July 30, 2012). This 143 page report, available here, was conducted by the GAO in the wake of the Deepwater Drilling incident in order to:

assess[ ] (1) Interior’s reorganization of its oversight of offshore oil and gas activities; (2) how key policy changes Interior has implemented since this incident have affected Interior’s environmental analyses, plan reviews, and drilling permit reviews; (3) the extent to which Interior’s inspections of drilling rigs and production platforms in the Gulf identify violations or result in civil penalty assessments; (4) when stakeholders provided input to Interior on proposed oil and gas activities, and the extent which they believe Interior considered their concerns; and (5) key challenges, if any, Interior faces in overseeing offshore oil and gas activities in the Gulf.

Based on its research the GAO recommended that the Department of the Interior improve the efficacy of its inspections with the "timely input of violation correction data, its capacity for categorizing oil and gas activities according to risk, and its strategic planning for information technology and workforce efforts."

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Draft Phase I Early Restoration Plan and Environmental Assessment

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Draft Phase I Early Restoration Plan and Environmental Assessment from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration consists of 8 projects that are listed in Table ES-1, and more fully described in this document. They address an array of injuries and are located throughout the Gulf
(Figure ES-2). Specifically, this proposed plan includes two oyster projects, two marsh projects, a nearshore artificial reef project, two dune projects, and a boat ramp enhancement project.

These projects address injuries in 4 of the 5 impacted states, on the coast and offshore, to mammals and marine organisms, and/or compensate for lost recreational opportunities for the public. While this plan includes a suite of proposed projects, each project was viewed as independent from the others. This Phase I Early Restoration Plan will be finalized after consideration of public comment and may include some or all of these proposed projects.

The Trustees anticipate that additional projects will be proposed and approved in subsequent rounds of the early restoration process until funds made available under the Framework Agreement are exhausted. It is important to emphasize that restoration proposals developed pursuant to the Framework Agreement are not intended to provide the full extent of restoration needed to satisfy the Trustees’ claims against BP. Restoration will continue until the public is fully compensated for the natural resources and services that were lost as a result of the spill.

Federal Oil and Gas: Interagency Committee Needs to Better Coordinate Research on Oil Pollution Prevention and Response -- GAO

This Government Accountability Office report (GAO-11-319), dated March 25, 2011, finds that "Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act in 1990 (OPA). Among other things, OPA established the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research (interagency committee) to coordinate an oil pollution research program among federal agencies, including developing a plan, having the National Academy of Sciences review that plan, and reporting to Congress on the interagency committee's efforts biennially. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion and fire led to the largest oil spill in U.S. history, raising new concerns about the effects of oil spills." The GAO recommends that "In order to better identify oil pollution risks, determine research priorities, and coordinate research efforts, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should direct the chair of the interagency committee to evaluate the contributions of past research to current knowledge on oil pollution prevention and response and report the results of these evaluations, including remaining gaps in knowledge, in its biennial reports to Congress."

Framework for Early Restoration Addressing Injuries Resulting from the Deeepwater Horizon Oil Spill -- NOAA

From the press release by NOAA "Under an unprecedented agreement announced today by the Natural Resource Trustees for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Trustees), BP has agreed to provide $1 billion toward early restoration projects in the Gulf of Mexico to address injuries to natural resources caused by the spill. The Trustees involved are: Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Department of Justice provided assistance in reaching the agreement. This early restoration agreement, the largest of its kind ever reached, represents a first step toward fulfilling BP’s obligation to fund the complete restoration of injured public resources, including the loss of use of those resources by the people living, working and visiting the area. The Trustees will use the money to fund projects such as the rebuilding of coastal marshes, replenishment of damaged beaches, conservation of sensitive areas for ocean habitat for injured wildlife, and restoration of barrier islands and wetlands that provide natural protection from storms."

BP's Complaints Against Transocean Over Gulf Oil Spill

Here are BP's pleading in the case styled "In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “ Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010". BP PARTIES’ COUNTER-COMPLAINT, CROSS-COMPLAINT AND THIRD PARTYCOMPLAINT AGAINST TRANSOCEAN AND CLAIM IN LIMITATION

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill:

This Congressional Research Service papers explores the issues that the Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill have set in motion about oil exploration and recovery in the Gulf of Mexico generally, about the federal offshore oil and gas program, and about the risks of deepwater drilling in particular. The incident
has raised many issues; this report provides a set of selected descriptions to give the reader a baseline and context for pursuing topics of interest.

Several themes trace through the diverse aspects of the incident:
• The explosion and oil spill having occurred, what lessons should be drawn from the incident? Such lessons may involve the appropriateness and capabilities of the technologies used in drilling and in trying to stop the spill; the adequacy of
the regulatory regime and how it was administered and enforced; possible implications of corporate cultures of the companies involved; and the adequacy
of cleanup technologies and of the safety net for impacted businesses and
communities.
• As oil and gas exploration and recovery moved into the deepwater frontier, were
technologies and regulatory capacities keeping pace with new and/or heightened risks? Technologies and regulations appropriate to onshore and shallow-water
exploration and recovery may not be adequate to address risks in deep water.
There are economic incentives to develop technologies to find and recover
deepwater oil and gas, but the question arises of whether concomitant incentives
exist to ensure that those technologies are robust enough to provide a reasonable
margin of safety in this more challenging environment. Likewise, it might be
asked if administrative and regulatory requirements appropriate to the lesschallenging onshore and shallow-water environments have been, or need to be,
strengthened to address deepwater risks.
• What interventions may be necessary to ensure recovery of Gulf resources and
amenities? The spilled oil will surely degrade over time; intervention might
accelerate cleanup, but may have its own costs.
• What does the Deepwater Horizon incident imply for national energy policy, and
the tradeoffs between energy needs, risks of deepwater drilling, and protection of
natural resources and amenities?